Labour Market Monopsony and Worker Welfare in the Nigerian Agro-Industrial Sector: An HR Economics Investigation

This study conducts an HR economics investigation of labour market monopsony and its effects on worker welfare in Nigeria's agro-industrial sector, focusing on large-scale processing and plantation enterprises in Ogun, Cross River, and Kebbi States representing the South West, South South, and North West geopolitical zones. Labour market monopsony, a condition in which a single or small number of employers exercise dominant buying power over local labour supply, suppresses wages and degrades working conditions in ways that standard competitive labour market HRM models fail to explain or address. The study employs a mixed-methods research design combining quantitative labour market analysis and qualitative worker welfare investigation. Phase 1 uses household survey data from 1,200 agricultural workers in three monopsonistic employer catchment areas to estimate employer wage-setting power using inverse labour supply elasticity calculations. Phase 2 deploys 50 semi-structured interviews with workers, union representatives, HR managers, and government labour inspectors to examine worker welfare and HR practice quality dimensions. Monopsony Theory, Labour Market Segmentation Theory, and Decent Work Framework provide multi-theoretic grounding. Findings confirm the presence of significant monopsony power in all three study sites, with wage mark-downs estimated between 18 and 34 percent below competitive market levels. Associated welfare deficits include inadequate safety equipment, restricted collective voice, and below-minimum-wage violations. Original contributions include Nigeria's first Agro-Industrial Labour Market Monopsony Index, a Worker Welfare Deficit Taxonomy, and targeted HR policy recommendations for regulatory enforcement and competitive market structure reform. Keywords: Labour Market Monopsony, Worker Welfare, Agro-Industrial Sector, HR Economics, Nigeria.