Institutional Economics of Community-Based Wildlife Governance in Nigerian Protected Landscapes

The governance of wildlife resources in Nigeria's protected landscapes involves complex interactions between formal state institutions, customary authorities, market actors, and community resource users, generating outcomes that economic and institutional theory has not yet adequately characterized for the Nigerian context. This dissertation applies institutional economics, specifically New Institutional Economics and Common Pool Resource theory, to analyze the governance architecture, transaction costs, and institutional performance of community-based wildlife governance arrangements across six protected landscapes representing all six Nigerian geopolitical zones. Original empirical data were collected through institutional analysis using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, transaction cost surveys, governance performance assessments, and 240 household interviews. Econometric analysis examines the determinants of governance performance and the magnitude of transaction costs associated with different governance models. Results demonstrate that hybrid governance arrangements combining formal state authority with customary land tenure institutions achieve significantly lower transaction costs and higher conservation outcome scores than either pure state management or fully devolved community management. Elite capture of governance benefits is a significant moderator of governance performance in all zones. Original theoretical contributions include a modified Common Pool Resource governance model incorporating the role of non-equilibrium ecological dynamics endemic to Nigerian savanna and wetland systems. Policy recommendations target institutional design features associated with efficient and equitable community wildlife governance. Keywords: institutional economics, community governance, Common Pool Resource, Nigeria, wildlife management