Game-Theoretic Analysis of Multi-Stakeholder Conflict in Nigerian Oil-Producing Communities

Resource conflicts in Nigeria's oil-producing communities in the South South geopolitical zone involve complex strategic interactions among multiple actors: oil companies, host communities, armed militant groups, and the Federal Government, each pursuing divergent interests over resource revenue sharing, environmental compensation, and development priorities. This study applies cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, specifically Nash bargaining, the Shapley value for coalition analysis, and repeated game models, to formally characterise the strategic structure of these multi-stakeholder conflicts in three Delta State communities. Payoff functions are constructed from quantitative data on community development fund allocations, environmental compensation payments, and documented grievance events sourced from published corporate social responsibility reports and conflict monitoring databases. Nash bargaining solutions are computed under symmetric and asymmetric bargaining power assumptions calibrated to observed power disparities. Shapley value analysis of potential cooperation coalitions reveals that three-way cooperation among communities, government, and industry generates a coalition surplus of 34 percent above the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome, but the unequal value distribution under current institutional arrangements destabilises this coalition. Repeated game analysis demonstrates that observable host community investment commitments sustain cooperative equilibria when discount factors exceed 0.71. Keywords: game theory, resource conflict, Niger Delta, Shapley value, Nash bargaining.