Analytical Study of Inter-Agency Coordination Failures in Counter-Insurgency Operations in Adamawa State

Effective counter-insurgency in Nigeria requires seamless coordination among military, police, intelligence, and civilian agencies, yet documented operational failures in Adamawa State suggest systemic coordination deficiencies that impede operational effectiveness. This study analytically examined inter-agency coordination failures in counter-insurgency operations in Adamawa State, North East Nigeria, with fieldwork covering Mubi, Gombi, and Hong LGA operational theatres from 2019 to 2023. A qualitative analytical design was employed, combining documentary analysis of available operational after-action reviews, ACLED incident data for Adamawa, and structured interviews with 22 military, police, intelligence, and civilian emergency management officials who had served in counter-insurgency roles in the state. Thematic and process analysis was applied. Results identified five recurrent coordination failure types: intelligence non-disclosure between DSS and military commands (cited by 86.4 percent of respondents as occurring frequently), absence of unified command in joint operations (77.3 percent), competing jurisdictional claims between NPF and army in recaptured areas (68.2 percent), civilian protection failure attributed to unclear authority chains (72.7 percent), and inadequate humanitarian-security coordination (81.8 percent). Three operational failures resulting in civilian casualties were directly attributed to coordination breakdown by respondents. The study provides an analytical contribution to understanding coordination failure mechanisms and recommends a permanent Joint Operations Coordination Centre for Adamawa State with mandatory cross-agency participation and shared situational awareness.

Keywords: inter-agency coordination, counter-insurgency, Adamawa State, operational failure, security coordination