Administrative Oversight and Corporate Governance in Nigerian State-Owned Enterprises

This study investigates the quality of administrative oversight and corporate governance in selected Nigerian state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with particular focus on parastatals operating in the South South and South East geopolitical zones. Nigerian SOEs have long been criticised for inefficiency, opacity, and poor financial management, raising fundamental questions about the effectiveness of government oversight mechanisms. A professional survey design is employed, with data collected from 170 board members, executive directors, supervising ministry officials, and auditors in six SOEs operating in the oil, manufacturing, and agricultural sectors. Quantitative data are analysed using descriptive statistics and regression, while qualitative data from interviews are thematically coded. The Corporate Governance Theory and Principal-Agent Framework jointly provide the analytical foundation. Findings reveal that most SOEs lack independent boards, maintain poor disclosure practices, and are shielded from competitive market pressures that would otherwise impose discipline. Government-appointed board members frequently lack sectoral expertise and are beholden to the political interests of appointing authorities rather than organisational performance imperatives. The study recommends the introduction of professional selection criteria for SOE board appointments, mandatory publication of annual performance reports, and the adoption of the National Code of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in all SOE governance frameworks. Keywords: administrative oversight, corporate governance, state-owned enterprises, parastatals, accountability.