An Original Examination of the Doctrine of Iqrar (Confession) in Islamic Law and Its Compatibility with the Right Against Self-Incrimination in Nigerian Constitutional Law

Iqrar (confession) occupies a foundational evidentiary role in Islamic criminal law, particularly for Hudud offences where it may serve as the primary proof of guilt, and its doctrinal requirements of voluntariness, repetition (in Hanafi law), mental capacity, and the right to retract create an Islamic evidentiary standard with both similarities and tensions with the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination under Section 36(11) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. This study develops an original examination of the Islamic doctrine of Iqrar and its compatibility with Nigerian constitutional self-incrimination protections. A theoretical and comparative doctrinal methodology is applied, constructing a comprehensive account of Iqrar requirements from Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali sources alongside the retraction doctrine, the voluntariness standard, and the judicial verification obligation. The constitutional analysis examines Section 36(11), the Evidence Act 2011 provisions on confessions, and selected Nigerian court decisions from 1999 to 2023 where Iqrar-based convictions were challenged on constitutional grounds. The study further develops an original compatibility test for evaluating whether a given application of Iqrar in Sharia proceedings satisfies both Islamic doctrinal validity and constitutional voluntariness standards. Available scholarship from northern Nigeria identifies the absence of a structured voluntariness inquiry in many Sharia Iqrar proceedings as the primary constitutional concern. The original contribution is a Dual Validity Standard for Iqrar admissibility that satisfies both Islamic evidentiary doctrine and constitutional protections. Keywords: Iqrar, confession, self-incrimination, Islamic evidence law, Nigerian constitutional law.