Analytical Assessment of Cyber-Physical Attack Surfaces in Nigerian Smart Grid Pilot Deployments

Smart grid pilot deployments by the Transmission Company of Nigeria and several distribution companies introduce cyber-physical vulnerabilities at the interface of IT and operational technology systems, yet no systematic attack surface analysis has been conducted for these Nigerian smart grid environments. This study analytically assessed cyber-physical attack surfaces in three smart grid pilot deployments operated by TCN and Eko Electricity Distribution Company in Lagos, covering advanced metering infrastructure, SCADA, and distribution automation systems. A threat modelling methodology using STRIDE was applied to system architecture diagrams and configuration data provided under research non-disclosure agreements. Vulnerability scoring was conducted using CVSSv3 for identified weaknesses. The assessment identified 67 attack surface entry points across the three deployments, categorised as meter tampering and replay attacks (AMI layer), Modbus unauthenticated command injection (field device layer), SCADA historian exploitation (IT-OT boundary), insecure remote access (VPN configurations), and supply chain firmware integrity gaps. Modbus command injection at the field device layer was the highest-risk attack category, with CVSS scores of 9.1 to 9.4 for confirmed vulnerabilities. Authentication weaknesses in the AMI head-end interface enabled potential mass meter manipulation. An attack tree for false data injection targeting grid stability was constructed, showing a four-step attack path requiring only three low-to-medium complexity capabilities. The study provides the first published attack surface analysis of Nigerian smart grid infrastructure and recommends the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission develop a mandatory smart grid cybersecurity certification programme.

Keywords: smart grid security, cyber-physical attacks, SCADA, Nigeria electricity, attack surface analysis