Analytical Assessment of Nigeria’s Electoral Management Body Independence: The Legal Status and Functional Autonomy of INEC

The independence of the Independent National Electoral Commission is constitutionally guaranteed under Section 158 of the 1999 Constitution, yet operational autonomy concerns have persistently been raised regarding INEC's budget dependence on executive release of funds, presidential appointment of its chairman and national commissioners, and the role of the National Assembly in confirming INEC appointments. These institutional design features potentially compromise the Commission's independence from the branches of government whose electoral activities it is tasked to regulate. This study analytically assesses the legal status and functional autonomy of INEC, examining the constitutional framework for INEC independence, the adequacy of legislative safeguards against executive influence, and the impact of structural dependence on INEC's election management credibility. A doctrinal and empirical methodology is applied, reviewing Sections 153, 158, and 160 of the 1999 Constitution, INEC establishment provisions, budget autonomy records from 2015 to 2023, court decisions on INEC independence challenges, and comparative assessment of electoral management body independence from Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa. The study applies the Electoral Integrity Framework and the ACE Network guidelines on EMB independence to evaluate INEC's functional autonomy profile. Available electoral management literature from Nigeria identifies the Presidential appointment power over the INEC Chairman as the most analytically significant formal independence constraint. The Electoral Management Body Independence Theory provides the primary analytical reference. Findings support constitutional amendment recommendations on INEC financial autonomy. Keywords: INEC independence, electoral management, constitutional law, election integrity, Nigeria.