Developing an Original Theory of Judicial Lawmaking in Nigeria: The Constitutional Court as Political Institution

The Supreme Court of Nigeria, as the apex constitutional court, performs a lawmaking function through constitutional interpretation and common law development that is theoretically distinct from its formal adjudicatory role. The theoretical understanding of Nigerian judicial lawmaking, its political dimensions, and its relationship to democratic theory has not been systematically developed in the Nigerian public law literature, which has largely focused on doctrinal case analysis rather than institutional theory. This study develops an original theory of judicial lawmaking in the Nigerian Supreme Court, examining the political, institutional, and jurisprudential conditions under which the Court expands or constrains its lawmaking role in constitutional adjudication. The study applies a theoretical mixed-methods design, combining a systematic quantitative analysis of all Supreme Court constitutional decisions from 2000 to 2023 (coded for activism-restraint variables, majority size, constitutional text departure, and policy impact), with qualitative discourse analysis of judicial reasoning in ten purposively selected landmark decisions. Political Jurisprudence Theory, New Legal Institutionalism, and Critical Legal Theory provide the theoretical scaffolding for original framework development. The study's original contribution is a Political Court Theory of Nigerian Judicial Lawmaking that explains the determinants and patterns of judicial activism and restraint in the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Findings have implications for Supreme Court reform, judicial appointment, and constitutional interpretation doctrine. Keywords: judicial lawmaking, constitutional adjudication, Supreme Court Nigeria, judicial activism, political jurisprudence.