Director Overboardedness and Governance Quality in Listed Firms in the South South and South East Zones of Nigeria

This study investigates the phenomenon of director overboardedness and its effect on governance quality in listed firms in the South South and South East geopolitical zones of Nigeria. Director overboardedness, which refers to the situation where directors serve on an excessive number of corporate boards simultaneously, is a governance concern because it limits the time, attention, and cognitive resources available to each board engagement. While the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria's governance code suggests limits on directorships, compliance monitoring is limited, and the prevalence and governance consequences of overboardedness in these two zones have not been empirically studied. Drawing on the attention-based view of the firm and board capital literature, this study examines the relationship between director busyness (measured by multiple directorship counts) and governance quality outcomes including board meeting attendance rates, audit opinion timeliness, earnings management levels, and director engagement scores. Panel data from thirty-five listed firms across the South South and South East zones are analysed over six years. Endogeneity in directorship appointments is addressed through instrumental variable regression. The study anticipates that overboarded directors are associated with lower governance quality, particularly in audit committee roles. Findings will assist regulators, institutional investors, and nomination committees in enforcing meaningful directorship limits. Keywords: director overboardedness, governance quality, board capital, corporate governance, South South South East Nigeria.