Ethnic Federalism, Constitutional Design, and Minority Rights in Nigeria: An Original Comparative Institutional Analysis

This dissertation develops an original comparative institutional analysis of ethnic federalism and minority rights protection in Nigeria, engaging critically with the constitutional arrangements of the 1999 Constitution and arguing that Nigeria's federal design systematically disadvantages ethnic minority communities in the Niger Delta, the Middle Belt, and other multi-ethnic zones through constitutional architecture designed to manage majority ethnic competition rather than to protect minority rights. The dissertation challenges both majoritarian and consociational prescriptions for Nigerian constitutional reform, proposing an original Federated Minority Rights Model as a theoretically grounded and empirically validated alternative. A mixed-method comparative institutional design is employed, combining systematic analysis of Nigerian constitutional documents from 1963 to 1999, comparative constitutional analysis of minority rights provisions in four similarly diverse federal systems including India, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Canada, and primary qualitative research involving 70 in-depth interviews with constitutional scholars, ethnic minority community leaders, and legislators across South South, North Central, and South East zones. The proposed Federated Minority Rights Model introduces three original constitutional design instruments: ethnic minority constituency reservation, asymmetric federal autonomy for historically marginalised zones, and constitutionalised resource revenue community benefit sharing. Empirical application demonstrates that these instruments would measurably improve minority rights outcomes within the existing federal architecture. Keywords: ethnic federalism, minority rights, constitutional design, Nigeria, comparative institutionalism.