Great Power Competition in West Africa and Its Implications for Nigerian Strategic Autonomy

This dissertation examines the implications of intensifying great power competition in West Africa, particularly between the United States, China, Russia, and France, for Nigeria's capacity to maintain strategic autonomy in its foreign policy choices. The expansion of Russian military influence through Wagner Group operations and state-to-state security agreements, the deepening of Chinese economic and infrastructure presence, and the sustained though contested French security footprint across the Sahel and Gulf of Guinea have created a complex strategic environment in Nigeria's immediate neighbourhood. Drawing on the theory of strategic autonomy, secondary power theory, and the geopolitics of peripheral regions, this research develops an original empirical and theoretical account of how Nigeria has navigated great power competitive dynamics from 2014 to 2024. Employing a qualitative small-N comparative case design, the study examines Nigeria's response to great power competition across four strategic domains: security cooperation, infrastructure financing, information environment management, and multilateral institutional alignment. Primary data are drawn from Nigerian National Security Council documentation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs strategic assessments, bilateral aid and investment data, and semi-structured interviews with senior national security officials and strategic studies scholars. The dissertation's theoretical contribution introduces a framework of managed entrapment to describe Nigeria's strategic situation, arguing that Nigeria is neither a fully autonomous actor nor a captured proxy but an intentional navigator of competing pressures within structural limits. Keywords: great power competition, Nigeria, strategic autonomy, West Africa, geopolitics.