Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform and Africa’s Interest: Assessing Nigeria’s Position in Multilateral Negotiations

This study analytically examines the global reform of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms and assesses Nigeria's interests and negotiating position in ongoing multilateral reform processes at UNCITRAL's Working Group III and in AfCFTA investment protocol negotiations. ISDS reform has emerged as a major issue in international investment law governance, driven by concerns about legitimacy deficits, arbitrator bias, inconsistent jurisprudence, and the chilling effect of investment arbitration on regulatory policy. Using an analytical legal methodology combining treaty analysis with systematic review of UNCITRAL reform documentation and African state positions, the research examines the principal reform proposals on the table including an appellate mechanism, a multilateral investment court, and a code of conduct for arbitrators, and evaluates their likely impact on Nigeria's legal and economic interests as both a capital-importing and increasingly capital-exporting state. It fills a gap in the literature by centring an African developing economy perspective in the global ISDS reform debate, which has been dominated by OECD state interests. Findings indicate that Nigeria's interests in ISDS reform are complex and in some respects divergent from both the traditional capital-exporting state position and the most radical reform proposals. An original Nigerian ISDS reform position matrix is developed, identifying priority reforms for Nigeria's negotiators. Recommendations include formal adoption of a Nigerian ISDS reform negotiating strategy, coordination with the African Union's investment policy framework, and investment in Nigeria's international investment law expertise. Keywords: ISDS, investment arbitration, UNCITRAL, AfCFTA, Nigeria.