The Constitutional Architecture of Security Sector Governance in Nigeria: Reform, Accountability, and Democratic Control

Effective constitutional governance of the security sector, encompassing the armed forces, police, intelligence agencies, and paramilitary organisations, is essential for preventing the abuse of coercive state power and maintaining democratic accountability. Nigeria's security sector governance architecture, established under the 1999 Constitution, has been extensively criticised for inadequate legislative oversight, insufficient independent accountability mechanisms, and structural incentives that perpetuate impunity for security force misconduct. This doctoral research develops an original constitutional theory of security sector governance for Nigeria, making a foundational scholarly contribution to a field at the intersection of constitutional law, security studies, and democratic theory. A multi-method legal research methodology is employed, combining doctrinal constitutional analysis with institutional ethnography of the National Assembly's defence and security committees, empirical field research on accountability mechanisms in four security agencies, and comparative constitutional analysis from Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa. Primary interviews were conducted with retired security sector officials, legal scholars, and parliamentary oversight committee members. Secondary sources include security sector reform literature, democratic governance scholarship, and Nigerian constitutional law publications from 2018 to 2024. The research makes three original scholarly contributions: an analytical mapping of constitutional accountability gaps in Nigerian security sector governance; an original Democratic Security Sector Constitutional Framework for Nigeria; and a normative theory of parliamentary security oversight applicable to Nigerian federalism. Keywords: security sector governance, constitutional law, accountability, democratic control, Nigeria.