The Political Economy of Human Rights Non-Compliance in Nigeria: A Structural Analysis

This doctoral research advances a structural political economy analysis of persistent human rights non-compliance in Nigeria, developing an original theoretical framework that moves beyond conventional compliance theory by integrating insights from political economy, institutional economics, and critical legal studies. Existing international human rights compliance scholarship relies predominantly on rationalist or normative theories that inadequately account for the structural factors embedded in Nigeria's colonial legacies, oil-dependent rent-seeking governance economy, elite bargaining dynamics, and federalism. The study draws on Gramsci's concept of hegemony, Acemoglu and Robinson's extractive institutions framework, and critical international law scholarship on the structural complicity of the international human rights system with economic inequality. The research methodology combines theoretical framework construction with empirical validation through three nested case studies examining non-compliance patterns in natural resource governance rights violations in Rivers State, political participation rights violations in electoral processes in Kogi State, and social protection rights violations in federal social investment program management. Data are gathered through elite interviews, government budget analysis, and systematic coding of human rights reports spanning 2015 to 2024. The research generates an original Structural Human Rights Deficit Index for Nigeria and proposes a structural compliance strategy that engages the political economy drivers of non-compliance rather than purely technical legal mechanisms. The dissertation makes a substantial original theoretical contribution to both international human rights law compliance theory and Nigerian political economy scholarship. Keywords: political economy, human rights compliance, structural analysis, Nigeria, institutional theory.