The Problem of Moral Luck and Its Implications for Criminal Responsibility in Nigerian Courts: An Empirical-Philosophical Study

This study provides an empirical-philosophical investigation of the problem of moral luck and its implications for criminal responsibility in Nigerian courts, examining whether the philosophical argument from moral luck undermines the fairness of criminal liability decisions in cases from the South West and North Central geopolitical zones. The problem of moral luck, analysed by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams, holds that outcomes affected by luck partly determine moral judgement in ways that cannot be philosophically justified because luck is outside the agent's control. A mixed-methods philosophical design is employed, combining systematic philosophical analysis of moral luck theory with qualitative analysis of 40 criminal cases from Lagos and Abuja courts where outcomes significantly affected by chance circumstances determined liability, supplemented by 30 interviews with criminal law philosophers, judges, and legal academics. Findings reveal that Nigerian criminal law implicitly incorporates outcome luck in ways that generate philosophical inconsistencies, particularly in attempted versus completed offence sentencing, where identical criminal intentions attract dramatically different penalties based solely on chance outcome differences. The study argues that philosophical analysis of moral luck requires reform of sentencing guidelines to focus on the moral quality of the agent's intention rather than the luck of the outcome. The study contributes an original empirical application of moral luck philosophy to Nigerian criminal law. Keywords: moral luck, criminal responsibility, Nigerian courts, philosophy of law, sentencing ethics.