The Problem of Moral Realism in African Philosophy: An Original Metaethical Analysis from the Igbo and Hausa-Fulani Traditions

This dissertation conducts an original metaethical analysis of moral realism in African philosophy, examining whether the Igbo (South East) and Hausa-Fulani (North West) philosophical traditions presuppose moral realism, moral anti-realism, or a distinctive African metaethical position that cannot be adequately captured by the dominant Western metaethical taxonomy. Metaethics, the philosophical inquiry into the nature, status, and foundations of moral claims, has been conducted almost exclusively within Western philosophical traditions, and the metaethical presuppositions of African philosophical ethics have not been systematically investigated, constituting a foundational gap in African philosophy. A four-phase methodology is employed, combining systematic philosophical analysis of moral realism and anti-realism from Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, and Hilary Putnam alongside African metaethical scholarship; deep ethnophilosophical investigation of moral metaphysical concepts in Igbo and Hausa-Fulani traditions through 85 interviews with traditional philosophers, Islamic scholars, and academic philosophers in Enugu, Anambra, Kano, and Sokoto States; comparative philosophical analysis identifying convergent and divergent metaethical commitments; and constructive development of the original African Communal Moral Realism thesis. The dissertation proposes African Communal Moral Realism as an original contribution, arguing that both Igbo and Hausa-Fulani traditions presuppose that moral facts are real but that their reality is constituted through communal recognition and ancestral validation rather than through mind-independent metaphysical facts, producing a distinctive metaethical position irreducible to standard Western alternatives. Keywords: moral realism, metaethics, Igbo philosophy, Hausa-Fulani ethics, African philosophy.