Philosophical Analysis of the Relationship Between Poverty and Moral Agency: Evidence from Rural Communities in Sokoto State

This study provides a philosophical analysis of the relationship between extreme poverty and moral agency, examining whether conditions of severe economic deprivation undermine the philosophical prerequisites of autonomous moral action among rural communities in Sokoto State, located in Nigeria's North West geopolitical zone. The philosophical question of whether poverty diminishes moral agency by constraining the range of choices available to individuals has been addressed theoretically but rarely subjected to empirical investigation in African rural contexts. A mixed-methods design is employed, combining philosophical analysis of moral agency from Gerald Dworkin, Christine Korsgaard, and Amartya Sen's capabilities approach with a structured survey of 250 rural community members in Sokoto State, supplemented by 30 in-Philosophyh interviews with community health workers, religious leaders, and philosophy academics. Structural equation modelling tests the philosophical hypothesis that capabilities deprivation systematically reduces the conditions for autonomous moral agency. Findings establish a significant negative relationship between poverty-induced capabilities deprivation and multiple indicators of moral agency, including practical reasoning capacity, resistance to coercion, and access to moral education, supporting the philosophical argument that extreme poverty is not merely an economic but also a moral harm. The study contributes an empirically grounded philosophical model of poverty-moral agency interaction to the global justice literature. Keywords: moral agency, poverty, capabilities approach, Sokoto State, philosophical analysis.