Regulatory Capture in Nigeria’s Petroleum Sector: Empirical Evidence and Reform Implications

This study empirically investigates the extent and mechanisms of regulatory capture in Nigeria's petroleum sector, examining whether NUPRC and NMDPRA regulatory decisions systematically favour industry interests over public and community welfare. Regulatory capture, defined as the process by which a regulatory agency advances the commercial or political interests of the industry it is intended to regulate, is a well-theorised risk in resource-rich developing countries. Using a mixed-methods empirical design, the research analyses a database of 180 NUPRC licensing decisions, penalty waivers, and inspection outcomes from 2021 to 2024, applying a capture detection methodology adapted from published political economy literature. Qualitative interviews with fifteen former government officials and nine civil society petroleum monitors supplement the quantitative data. Findings reveal statistically significant patterns of penalty reduction for politically connected operators and inconsistent enforcement correlated with operator size and government equity. The study contributes original empirical evidence to the regulatory capture literature in the context of Sub-Saharan African petroleum governance and recommends structural reforms including independent regulatory appointments and mandatory conflict of interest audits. Keywords: regulatory capture, NUPRC, NMDPRA, petroleum governance, empirical evidence.