Corporate Political Strategy and Firm Competitive Advantage in Nigeria: Mechanisms, Moderators, and Outcomes

This study develops and tests a comprehensive theoretical model of corporate political strategy and its effects on competitive advantage in Nigeria's institutional environment. Nigerian firms operate in an environment where political connections and regulatory relationships constitute consequential strategic resources, yet the theoretical mechanisms linking political strategy to competitive outcomes remain poorly understood. Political resource-based view, institutional economics, and stakeholder theory provide the theoretical scaffolding. The research employs a mixed methods sequential design. Qualitative exploration using forty expert interviews with corporate strategists, regulators, and political economy scholars provided conceptual grounding. A quantitative survey of 180 firms across six sectors tested the resulting theoretical model using structural equation modelling. Political strategy dimensions including information, constituency building, and financial strategy were operationalized. Competitive advantage was measured through profitability sustainability, market share stability, and regulatory licensing efficiency. Findings indicate that political strategy generates competitive advantage through three mechanisms: information asymmetry access, regulatory barrier manipulation, and legitimacy conferral. Industry political salience significantly moderates the strategy-advantage relationship. The study identifies an ethical boundary condition where corruption-based political strategies generate short-term advantage but significant long-term reputational and legal risks. The research advances political strategy theory by providing a Nigeria-specific model with empirically validated mechanisms and boundary conditions. Keywords: corporate political strategy, competitive advantage, Nigeria, institutional environment, structural equation modelling.