Local Government Autonomy, Democratic Backsliding, and the Erosion of Grassroots Governance in Nigeria: A Comparative Constitutional Analysis

This dissertation conducts a comparative constitutional analysis of local government autonomy provisions across Nigeria's thirty-six state constitutions and the 1999 Federal Constitution, theorizing how constitutional design choices enable or constrain democratic backsliding in grassroots governance. Since Nigeria's return to civilian governance in 1999, there has been a systematic erosion of local government autonomy through state executive interference in council elections, illegal dissolution of councils, diversion of statutory allocations, and appointment of unaccountable caretaker committees, a pattern that the constitutional literature has inadequately theorized as democratic backsliding at the sub-national level. Employing Democratic Backsliding Theory, Constitutional Institutionalism, and the Veto Players Framework, this dissertation applies a comparative constitutional analysis methodology across all thirty-six states, coding and analyzing local government provisions across five constitutional dimensions: financial autonomy, electoral independence, functional authority, judicial protection, and accountability obligations. Primary data is gathered from 70 elite interviews with constitutional lawyers, judicial officers, former governors, local government associations, and civil society constitutional advocacy organizations. Secondary data includes constitutional amendment records, state High Court rulings on local government autonomy cases, and comparative literature on democratic backsliding in West Africa. The dissertation makes an original contribution to the constitutional law and governance literature by developing a Local Government Constitutional Autonomy Index and mapping its correlation with democratic backsliding intensity across all states. Keywords: Local government autonomy, democratic backsliding, constitutional analysis, Nigeria, grassroots governance.