Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Mining Licence Allocation in Nigeria

Mining licence allocation in Nigeria is widely perceived to be influenced by political connections and patronage networks rather than by merit-based resource governance principles, yet the empirical basis for this understanding and its implications for sector development remain underdeveloped in academic literature. This dissertation conducts a theoretical and empirical analysis of the political economy of mining licence allocation in Nigeria, drawing on new institutionalist political economy theory and combining quantitative licence database analysis with qualitative institutional ethnography. A comprehensive dataset of 4,218 mining licences issued between 2007 and 2023 was constructed from Federal Ministry of Mines and Steel Development records supplemented by freedom of information requests. Network analysis mapped corporate ownership relationships and political affiliation connections of licence holders. Statistical models tested the association between political connection indicators and licence characteristics including speed of approval, block acreage, and strategic mineral categories. Qualitative interviews with 48 civil servants, industry insiders, and policy analysts provided institutional process narratives. Results demonstrate statistically significant associations between political network position and licence approval speed, with politically connected applicants receiving approvals averaging 9 months faster than unconnected counterparts. Strategic mineral licences show the strongest political connection effect. An original political settlement theory of Nigerian mining governance is proposed, explaining how competing elite interests are accommodated through the licence allocation system. Recommendations address transparency, civil society monitoring, and beneficial ownership disclosure. Keywords: political economy, mining licence, Nigeria, governance, rent-seeking.