A Theory of Strategic Ambiguity in EU-Nigeria Security Cooperation: Empirical Evidence from Lake Chad

This doctoral study develops an original theory of strategic ambiguity as a governing logic of EU-Nigeria security cooperation, subjecting this theory to empirical testing through detailed analysis of EU-Nigeria security engagement in the Lake Chad Basin from 2014 to 2024. The study argues that EU security cooperation with Nigeria is systematically characterised by deliberate ambiguity in mandate, accountability, and outcomes attribution, serving interests of both EU donors and Nigerian security actors while obscuring the empirical record on cooperation effectiveness. Drawing on Wendt's constructivism, Barnett and Finnemore's international organisations sociology, and strategic ambiguity theory from organisational studies, the research develops an original International Security Studies contribution. Empirical evidence is generated through analysis of an original dataset of 120 EU-Nigeria security cooperation agreements and programme documents, supplemented by 40 elite interviews with EU CSDP officials, Nigerian military and civilian security actors, Lake Chad Basin Commission representatives, and MNJTF commanders. Process tracing examines four detailed case studies of specific EU-Nigeria security cooperation episodes, mapping the causal mechanisms through which strategic ambiguity functions in practice. Original contributions include the Strategic Ambiguity Model of EU-Africa security cooperation, empirical findings from the Lake Chad case, and a theoretically grounded critique of current EU security cooperation accountability frameworks. Keywords: EU-Nigeria security cooperation, strategic ambiguity, Lake Chad Basin, security theory, CSDP.