An Original Theory of Moral Progress and Its Application to Human Rights Development in Post-Colonial Nigeria

This dissertation develops an original theory of moral progress and applies it to the analysis of human rights development in post-colonial Nigeria across all six geopolitical zones, addressing the philosophical question of whether there are coherent criteria for identifying moral improvement in collective human life and whether Nigerian history since independence in 1960 satisfies those criteria. The concept of moral progress is philosophically contested, and existing accounts from Julia Annas, Peter Singer, and Allen Wood have been developed without systematic engagement with post-colonial African experience, constituting a significant gap in the moral philosophy literature. A three-phase methodology is employed, combining systematic philosophical analysis of moral progress theories; empirical investigation of human rights trajectories in Nigeria through analysis of constitutional amendments, court decisions, human rights commission reports, and 85 interviews with human rights philosophers, legal scholars, and civil society practitioners across all six zones; and constructive philosophical synthesis developing the original Progressive Moral Realism Theory. The dissertation proposes the Progressive Moral Realism Theory as an original contribution, which specifies moral progress criteria as the expansion of the circle of moral recognition, the reduction of structural violence, and the institutionalisation of dignity norms, and applies these criteria to produce a philosophically rigorous assessment of Nigerian moral development since 1960. Findings reveal a pattern of non-linear progress marked by significant setbacks that require philosophical explanation beyond simple optimism or pessimism. Keywords: moral progress, human rights philosophy, post-colonial Nigeria, moral realism, progressive ethics.