Disclosure of Board Remuneration and Shareholder Value in the Nigerian Banking Sector

This study examines the effect of board remuneration disclosure quality on shareholder value creation in the Nigerian banking sector. Transparency in executive and director compensation is a governance requirement under the Central Bank of Nigeria's corporate governance guidelines for banks, yet the depth and comparability of remuneration disclosures across banks vary considerably. Shareholders require clear remuneration information to assess whether board pay is commensurate with value delivered and to exercise meaningful oversight at annual general meetings. Drawing on information asymmetry theory and the stewardship model, this study evaluates how the quality of remuneration disclosures in bank annual reports relates to market-based and accounting-based shareholder value metrics. An ex-post facto design is adopted, using content analysis of remuneration disclosures from annual reports of fourteen listed deposit money banks over five years. Shareholder value is measured using total shareholder return and price-to-book ratio. Panel regression analysis controls for bank size, capital adequacy, and profitability. The study anticipates that higher remuneration disclosure quality is positively associated with market valuation. Findings will assist the Central Bank of Nigeria, bank boards, and investor advocates in designing and enforcing more rigorous remuneration disclosure standards. Keywords: board remuneration, disclosure quality, shareholder value, corporate governance, banking sector.