Judicial Populism, Constitutional Crisis, and the Politics of Electoral Adjudication in Nigeria

This study examines the emergence of what the study conceptualises as judicial populism in Nigeria's electoral adjudication system, analysing how the courts have become sites of contested political legitimacy in which judicial decisions carry partisan implications that challenge the institutional autonomy of the judiciary and the legitimacy of electoral outcomes. Nigeria's post-election litigation has escalated dramatically in the Fourth Republic, with nearly every major election producing tribunal and appellate decisions that reverse electoral outcomes, relocate power, and trigger constitutional crises. Drawing on the judicial politics literature, the populism in institutions framework, and the comparative constitutional law tradition, the study develops an original theory of judicial populism in electoral adjudication contexts, arguing that judges in politically contested electoral cases face structural incentives to respond to public opinion and elite pressure in ways that compromise judicial impartiality. The theory is operationalised through analysis of 246 election petition tribunal and appellate court decisions from 2015 to 2023, coded for judicial reasoning patterns, outcome distributions relative to party affiliation of petitioners, and citation of procedural versus substantive grounds. The study also conducts fieldwork interviews with senior lawyers and retired electoral tribunal judges. Findings reveal systematic patterns of outcome variation that are difficult to explain through legal reasoning alone, suggesting the influence of extra-judicial factors on adjudicative behaviour. The study contributes original theoretical development and an empirical measurement methodology to the African judicial politics literature. Keywords: judicial populism, electoral adjudication, constitutional crisis, judicial politics, Nigeria