Public Procurement Reform and Value for Money in Anambra State Capital Development Authority

Public procurement reform has been widely embraced across sub-Saharan Africa as a strategy for improving efficiency, reducing corruption, and ensuring value for money in government spending. This study evaluates the impact of procurement reform on value for money outcomes in the Anambra State Capital Development Authority, with focus on infrastructure project delivery in Awka and its environs. The study is anchored on the Public Choice Theory, which posits that public officials, like private actors, respond to incentives and that institutional rules governing procurement determine the quality of resource allocation decisions. A descriptive survey research design was employed. The population comprised authority procurement officers, contractors, civil society monitors, and project beneficiaries, from which 245 respondents were sampled through stratified random and purposive selection. A structured questionnaire supplemented by documentary review served as instruments, and data were analysed using regression and chi-square statistics. Findings indicate that the adoption of competitive open tendering and the introduction of e-procurement have improved contract award transparency. However, value for money is undermined by contract variations, poor supervision, and post-award collusion between contractors and inspecting officers. The study concludes that procurement reforms have had partial success and require complementary enforcement and oversight mechanisms. It is recommended that the authority strengthen post-award monitoring through independent verification agents and enforce strict sanctions for contract inflation and variation fraud.

Keywords: Public Procurement, Value for Money, Reform, Anambra State, Infrastructure