The Political Economy of Petroleum Law Reform in Nigeria: Power, Interests, and Institutional Inertia in the Making of the PIA 2021

This study investigates the political economy of petroleum law reform in Nigeria, offering an original theoretical and empirical account of how competing elite interests, rent-seeking behaviour, and institutional inertia shaped the two-decade legislative process that ultimately produced the Petroleum Industry Act 2021. The PIA was introduced in various forms from 2008 before its eventual passage in 2021, making it one of the longest legislative reform processes in Nigerian history. The research employs a political economy methodology combining historical process tracing, archival legislative document analysis, and sixty-five elite interviews with former legislators, NNPC executives, IOC representatives, civil society actors, and international development consultants involved in the reform process. Theoretical frameworks are drawn from the new institutional economics of law, interest group theory, and patrimonialism literature applied to resource governance. The study generates an original theory of petroleum law reform blockage that explains stalling, dilution, and revival patterns through an analysis of rent distribution coalitions. The findings make a substantial original contribution to Nigerian petroleum law history and to the comparative study of oil sector legislative reform in developing countries. Keywords: political economy, petroleum law reform, PIA 2021, Nigeria, institutional inertia.