Theorising European Union Conditionality and African State Sovereignty: Evidence from Nigeria’s Governance Reform Processes

This doctoral study develops an original theory of the interaction between European Union development conditionality and African state sovereignty, subjecting it to empirical investigation through the case of Nigeria's governance reform processes between 2010 and 2024. The study advances beyond existing binary framings that position EU conditionality either as legitimate norm promotion or illegitimate sovereignty violation, developing instead a dynamic sovereignty bargaining model that theorises how Nigerian state actors strategically manage EU conditionality demands while maintaining essential sovereignty claims. The theoretical framework synthesises Wendt's constructivist sovereignty theory, Mosse's anthropology of development, and Nigerian postcolonial political thought. Empirical analysis draws on an extensive primary source archive including EU-Nigeria governance programme files obtained through EU document access procedures, Nigerian presidency governance reform correspondence, and 60 elite interviews with EU officials, Nigerian reform technocrats, civil society accountability actors, and political leaders across the six geopolitical zones. Process tracing methodology examines specific governance reform episodes including anti-corruption agency reform, budget transparency, and judicial independence initiatives, mapping the causal mechanisms linking EU conditionality engagement to policy change or stasis. Original contributions include the sovereignty bargaining model, original archival findings on conditionality negotiation dynamics, and theoretically grounded comparative conclusions applicable beyond the Nigeria case. Keywords: EU conditionality, African sovereignty, governance reform, Nigeria, sovereignty bargaining model.