Political Economy of Road Infrastructure Allocation in Nigeria: An Institutional Analysis Across Geopolitical Zones

Road infrastructure allocation in Nigeria is shaped not only by technical need assessments but by political economy dynamics that systematically advantage or disadvantage different regions and communities. This study conducts an institutional analysis of the political economy of road infrastructure allocation across Nigeria's six geopolitical zones from 2000 to 2024. The study employs a mixed methods research design, combining a geospatial analysis of federal road expenditure data disaggregated by project, state, and electoral cycle with qualitative institutional analysis drawing on 45 semi-structured interviews with federal legislators, ministry officials, civil society budget monitors, and transport sector analysts. Theoretical anchors include the distributive politics literature, principal-agent theory applied to intergovernmental infrastructure finance, and Acemoglu and Robinson's institutional persistence framework. Findings reveal statistically significant electoral cycle effects in road allocation, with expenditure surges in presidential election years and disproportionate allocation to swing states relative to objective transport need indicators. The North East and North West zones consistently receive below-need allocations relative to their road network density deficits, while South West and North Central zones demonstrate better alignment between need and allocation. The study makes original theoretical contributions by demonstrating that transport infrastructure allocation in low-income federal states exhibits a hybrid of distributive and developmental political logics that existing theories inadequately capture. These findings have implications for governance reform, fiscal federalism design, and donor investment strategy in Nigeria's transport sector. Keywords: political economy, road infrastructure, allocation, Nigeria, institutional analysis.