Power, Politics, and Project Decision-Making in Nigerian Federal Government Agencies: A Political Economy Analysis

Project decision-making in Nigerian federal agencies is embedded in political economy dynamics that conventional rational-technical project management theory cannot account for. This study applies political economy analysis to examine power and politics in project decision-making across Nigerian federal government agencies. An interpretive political economy design will conduct in-depth case studies of project decision processes in four federal agencies covering project selection, contractor appointment, budget allocation, and implementation prioritization. Sixty purposive interviews with current and former officials, political appointees, civil society monitors, and contractors will be conducted. Discourse analysis and process-tracing will reveal how political incentive structures, patron-client networks, and bureaucratic authority shape project outcomes. This study provides an original theoretical integration of political economy and project management, developing a power-sensitive model of public project decision-making specific to the Nigerian institutional context. Findings will contribute to anti-corruption project governance reform discourse and the design of accountability mechanisms for federal project management. Keywords: political economy, power, project decision-making, federal agencies, Nigeria