Executive-Legislative Relations and Budgetary Process in Nigeria: A Study of the National Assembly (2019-2023)

This study investigates the dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Nigeria's budgetary process, focusing on the interactions between the executive branch and the National Assembly between 2019 and 2023. Budget conflicts between the executive and legislature have frequently disrupted fiscal planning and delayed appropriation laws in Nigeria's presidential democracy. The study is anchored on the Separation of Powers doctrine as theorised by Montesquieu and applied in Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, which vests distinct budgetary functions in each branch of government. A mixed-methods research design was employed, combining quantitative content analysis of four appropriation bills with qualitative interviews involving eight legislative aides and budget analysts. Data was also drawn from budget implementation reports and National Assembly records. Findings reveal persistent friction between executive budget proposals and legislative appropriations, characterised by arbitrary insertion of projects, reallocation of funds, and delays in budget passage averaging 4.2 months across the study period. The study finds that institutional rivalry, constituency pressures, and patronage politics are the primary drivers of executive-legislative budget conflicts. It further reveals that these conflicts have resulted in fiscal uncertainty, poor budget implementation rates, and diminished investor confidence. It is concluded that dysfunctional executive-legislative relations undermine the efficacy of Nigeria's budgetary process. The study recommends the enactment of a Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Process Reform Act, as well as mandatory joint executive-legislative pre-budget consultations.

Keywords: Executive-legislative relations, budgetary process, National Assembly, separation of powers, fiscal governance