Economic Statecraft and Semiconductor Export Controls in US-China Technology Competition

Background: The escalation of United States semiconductor export restrictions targeting China since 2022, including expanded controls on advanced chip manufacturing equipment through 2023 and 2024, represents a significant evolution in the use of economic statecraft within great power technological competition. Aims/objectives: This study examines how export control policies function as instruments of strategic denial and their broader implications for global semiconductor supply chain restructuring. Method: A qualitative policy analysis was conducted using official trade regulations, allied coordination statements with Japan and the Netherlands, and industry reports on supply chain relocation trends during the relevant period. Results: Findings indicate that coordinated multilateral export controls have measurably slowed Chinese advanced chip production capacity, while simultaneously accelerating Chinese state investment in indigenous semiconductor research and alternative supply chains. Allied coordination proved essential to control effectiveness, though enforcement gaps persisted regarding third-country transshipment routes. Conclusion: The research concludes that semiconductor export controls represent an increasingly central tool of geoeconomic competition, with mixed long-term effectiveness given adaptive responses from targeted states. Sustained policy success depends on continued allied coordination and dynamic adjustment to evolving circumvention strategies employed by affected industries and governments seeking to bypass the existing restrictive framework through indirect channels and intermediary jurisdictions.

Keywords: economic statecraft, semiconductor controls, US-China competition, export restrictions, technology decoupling