A Theoretical Framework for Corporate Governance in Resource-Dependent Economies: Evidence from the Nigerian Petroleum Sector

This study develops and tests an original theoretical framework for corporate governance in resource-dependent economies, drawing on evidence from Nigeria's petroleum sector. Existing corporate governance theories, including agency theory, stewardship theory, and stakeholder theory, were largely developed in the context of mature market economies and may insufficiently account for the governance dynamics unique to resource-dependent states characterised by concentrated rent distribution, regulatory capture risks, and weak institutional environments. This study systematically synthesises the resource curse literature, institutional theory, and political economy governance frameworks to propose an integrated governance model specific to resource-dependent contexts. The framework is empirically tested using twenty years of longitudinal data from twenty-five petroleum sector entities spanning listed companies, government-owned enterprises, and joint venture entities. A mixed-method research design is employed, combining qualitative institutional mapping with quantitative panel data analysis using generalised method of moments estimators. Governance effectiveness is assessed across political independence, accountability infrastructure, stakeholder inclusiveness, and long-term value orientation dimensions. The study introduces the concept of resource governance isomorphism to explain why firms in petroleum sectors adopt governance forms that appear compliant but perform weakly in substantive accountability terms. Original contributions include the theoretical framework, a validated resource governance effectiveness scale, and policy propositions for reform. Findings are relevant for the Nigerian government, NNPC Limited, and international governance reform bodies. Keywords: governance theory, resource-dependent economy, petroleum sector, institutional theory, governance framework.