Corporate Governance and Systemic Risk in the Nigerian Financial System: Network Analysis and Policy Implications

This dissertation investigates the relationship between corporate governance quality and systemic risk accumulation in the Nigerian financial system, employing network analysis methodologies. Systemic risk, defined as the risk that governance failures in one or more financial institutions trigger contagion effects across the broader system, has received growing attention since the global financial crisis. In Nigeria, the interconnectedness of banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and capital market operators creates channels through which poor governance in individual institutions can amplify system-wide instability. Drawing on systemic risk theory, financial network analysis, and corporate governance literature, this study constructs a governance-weighted financial network using bilateral exposure data from Central Bank of Nigeria supervisory reports and governance quality scores for forty financial institutions over ten years. Network centrality measures are used to identify systemically important governance-weak institutions. Spectral analysis and contagion simulation models assess how governance quality variations propagate systemic risk. The study makes three original contributions: a governance-augmented systemic risk measurement model, empirical identification of governance-systemic risk transmission channels in Nigeria, and policy-relevant governance threshold analyses. Findings will assist the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Financial Stability Committee, and systemic risk regulatory bodies in incorporating governance quality into macro-prudential policy frameworks. Keywords: systemic risk, corporate governance, financial networks, macro-prudential policy, Nigeria.