Federalism, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, and Development Equity in Nigeria: A Constitutional Political Economy Analysis

This study undertakes a constitutional political economy analysis of Nigeria's federalism architecture, intergovernmental fiscal relations, and their long-run implications for development equity across states and geopolitical zones. The design of Nigeria's fiscal federalism, including revenue allocation principles, derivation formulae, intervention fund governance, and local government financial autonomy, has generated persistent contestation and is widely argued to perpetuate regional development inequality. Drawing on constitutional political economy theory, fiscal federalism literature, and recent comparative federalism studies from 2019 to 2024, the study employs a multi-method research design integrating historical constitutional analysis, legal document interpretation, quantitative fiscal equity analysis, and elite political economy interviews. A Development Equity Index is constructed from fiscal transfer data, human development outcomes, and infrastructure investment records across all 36 states from 1999 to 2023. Factor analysis, cluster analysis, and spatial econometrics identify development equity patterns. Sixty elite interviews with constitutional lawyers, former Finance Ministers, Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission members, and subnational governance specialists provide political economy interpretation. The study generates original theoretical contributions through the Constitutional Fiscal Equity Model, which integrates bargaining power asymmetry, constitutional lock-in effects, and political cycle influences as co-determinants of fiscal equity outcomes in multi-ethnic federal states. Findings advance fiscal federalism theory and provide constitutionally grounded reform recommendations for Nigeria's ongoing constitutional review process. Keywords: fiscal federalism, constitutional political economy, development equity, Nigeria, intergovernmental relations