Oil Politics and Development Paradox in Ondo State

This study examines the development paradox in Ondo State, investigating why a state with significant oil revenue and onshore petroleum resources continues to record poor human development outcomes in health, education, and infrastructure relative to its resource endowments. The resource curse thesis has been extensively debated in the political economy literature, and Ondo State provides a compelling sub-national case for examining how oil revenues are allocated, managed, and translated into development outcomes. Using a documentary research design supplemented by interviews with state government officials, civil society organisations, and community development representatives, the study traces the revenue flows from oil derivation, federation account allocations, and internally generated revenue into state budget appropriations and actual expenditure patterns. The rentier state theory and the sub-national resource curse framework are applied to analyse the political economy dynamics that shape development outcomes in resource-rich states. Findings reveal that despite significant oil revenues, Ondo State's development outcomes have been constrained by elite capture of resource rents, weak budget execution, underdeveloped non-oil sectors, and limited accountability mechanisms for resource management. The South West geopolitical zone context adds complexity, as Ondo State must navigate political relationships with both federal authorities over derivation claims and the broader zone's political dynamics. Recommendations include adoption of an open budget system, strengthening the state's internal audit institutions, and constitutionally mandated development benchmarks for oil-revenue-dependent states. Keywords: oil politics, development paradox, Ondo State, resource curse, rentier state