The Political Economy of Land Administration Reform in Nigeria: Explaining Reform Outcomes Across States

This dissertation develops a political economy theory of land administration reform in Nigeria, explaining why reform outcomes differ dramatically across states despite common federal land law and similar reform advocacy from international organisations. Land administration quality is widely identified as a primary constraint on Nigerian real estate market development, housing access, and private investment, but the political conditions under which meaningful reform is initiated, sustained, and translated into practice remain theoretically underdeveloped. The dissertation makes an original contribution by applying political economy theory, specifically veto player analysis, elite interest theory, and reform coalition theory, to the specific dynamics of land administration reform in Nigeria's federal system. Case-oriented comparative analysis examines land administration reform trajectories in eight states representing different geopolitical zones and reform outcome profiles, selected to provide maximum variation in reform success. For each state case, in-depth qualitative research including fifty interviews with government officials, land professionals, and political economy experts, and analysis of policy documents, reform programme records, and institutional performance data, provides the empirical basis for case analysis. Cross-case comparative analysis using Qualitative Comparative Analysis methods identifies the configurations of conditions associated with reform success and failure. Results identify two reform-enabling configurations: a technocratic window configuration where an insulated reform team has gubernatorial protection from vested interests, and a crisis pressure configuration where fiscal shock removes resistance by making land revenue collection imperative. Findings have implications for international development support for Nigerian land administration reform. Keywords: political economy, land administration reform, Nigeria, institutional reform, veto players.